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FAMILY LAW’S EXCLUSIONS 
Clare Huntington* 
 
As Fordham Law School commemorates the hundredth anniversary of 
women in its ranks, the school is also acknowledging the ways it has 
excluded women.  For this special Issue celebrating scholarship by the 
women of Fordham, I see a similar theme echoing in my work.  From my 
first article,1 published soon after I graduated from law school, through my 
most recent work,2 I have identified and explored the exclusions riddling 
family law. 
At a fundamental level, family law fails to recognize core attributes of the 
human experience, most notably emotion.  Through an extensive body of 
interdisciplinary research, we know a lot about the emotional arc of family 
relationships, but family law often does not reflect this knowledge.  To 
address this exclusion, I argued for the introduction of the study of law and 
emotion in family law.3  With a few exceptions, family law scholars pay scant 
attention to emotion, missing the potential for generating insights using the 
methods of law and emotion.4  In my own work in the field, I have focused 
on theories of human relationships that posit a predictable cycle of emotions 
in close relationships.  Individuals feel love for another, inevitably transgress, 
intentionally and unintentionally, against those they love, feel guilty about 
the transgression, and then seek to repair the damage.5  In the family, this 
cycle marks relationships between adults as well as between parents and 
children.  Some transgressions are minor, including verbal disagreements, 
and some transgressions are serious, including recurrent violence.  
Unfortunately, family law’s rules, processes, and practice are largely at odds 
with the cycles of emotions that are the hallmark of most relationships.6  
Across a range of contexts, including divorce, adoption, and child welfare, 
family law recognizes love and transgression but does not adequately account 
for guilt or foster, when appropriate, the drive to reparation.  There are some 
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 1. See generally Clare Huntington, Welfare Reform and Child Care: A Proposal for State 
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 2. See generally Clare Huntington, Early Childhood Development and the Law, 90 S. 
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 3. For my first foray, see Clare Huntington, Repairing Family Law, 57 DUKE L.J. 1245 
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 5. See, e.g., id. at 1262. 
 6. Id. 
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exceptions, such as the use of mediation in divorce, but there is far more that 
can be done.  Even the reforms that are taking root are undertheorized and 
incomplete and thus, not surprisingly, sometimes actively challenged. 
I proposed a reparative model of family law to undergird nascent reforms 
and encourage other innovations.  The reparative model recognizes that 
family-like relationships often persist even after legal relationships are 
altered.  It thus leads to new substantive rules that recognize and support 
these liminal relationships.  The reparative model encourages reforms to the 
process of family law by de-emphasizing adversarial procedures.  And it 
fosters changes to the practice of family law by asking family law attorneys 
to be more attuned to the potential for repair.  There are limits to reparation, 
of course, with family violence a critical area for caution.  But, ultimately, 
the reparative model would bring about a sea change in family law, providing 
a framework for the law to account for the full range of human experience 
and the cyclical nature of emotion in familial relationships. 
Even when family law does try to engage more broadly with the human 
experience, it can leave out or marginalize entire categories of relationships.  
Until only a few years ago, our legal system failed to recognize same-sex 
relationships.  In my scholarship, I identified a mechanism family law uses 
to reinforce traditional relationships.  Drawing on the work of Erving 
Goffman and others, I argued that family law reflects and endorses narrow 
images of families—social fronts, in Goffman’s terms—requiring those who 
seek legal recognition to fit within the existing social front.7  This 
constraining mechanism means that even as family law draws new 
relationships within its ambit, it requires the individuals to satisfy dominant 
norms.  Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court relied on this mechanism when it 
recognized the right of same-sex couples to marry.8  Writing for the majority, 
Justice Kennedy emphasized the many ways that same-sex couples are 
similar to different-sex couples and thus deserving of state recognition.9  In 
this way, the success of marriage equality was marred by the re-inscription 
of traditional family norms. 
In recent years, my scholarship has focused on another far-reaching, but 
far less studied, exclusion: family law’s failure to address the needs of 
nonmarital families.  Family law is designed for families with married 
parents, despite the reality that 40 percent of children are born to unmarried 
parents, most of whom will never marry.10  Although family law no longer 
penalizes “illegitimate” children, the marital family continues to dominate 
family law.  Substantive rules draw a clear distinction between married and 
unmarried couples, affecting issues as fundamental as parental rights for 
fathers and property rights for cohabitants.  Family law’s institutions assume 
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couples ending their relationships will go through the court system, as marital 
families must, but unmarried families typically do not.  And significant 
consequences flow from this institutional myopia, such as unmarried couples 
not having the benefit of a clear order determining when each parent will see 
their child.  Family law’s norms reinforce traditional notions of married 
family life, with the father as the breadwinner and the mother the caregiver, 
even though this does not describe the reality of nonmarital family life. 
Family law’s exclusion of nonmarital families works to the serious 
detriment of these families, undermining already tenuous bonds and 
contributing to negative outcomes for children.  I proposed a new approach 
to family law that would downplay the significance of marriage.11  As a 
foundation, I offered a new theory of state regulation, built on the insight that 
it is possible to separate marriage, but not relationships, from parenthood.  
The state should thus help unmarried parents become effective co-parents, 
especially after their relationship ends, so they can provide children with the 
healthy relationships crucial to child development.  This requires new rules, 
new institutions, and new social norms.12 
Finally, family law does not only leave out important relationships, it also 
excludes critical issues.  My most recent focus, building on this insight, has 
been early childhood development.13  A wealth of interdisciplinary research 
demonstrates that early childhood is critical for the development of cognitive 
abilities, language, and psychosocial skills; the parent-child relationship 
plays a pivotal role in the development of these skills; and early childhood 
relationships and experiences have a deep and lasting impact on a child’s life 
trajectory, meaning that disadvantages during early childhood replicate 
inequality.  Despite the critical importance of this period of development, the 
law does not adequately account for the particular needs of children and 
families during early childhood.  Family law’s rules tend to lump children 
into an undifferentiated category, regardless of age.  In almost every state, 
child custody rules are not age specific, ignoring the particular needs of very 
young children.14  And the rules governing the placement of children in foster 
care similarly do not account for age.  Instead, one overarching rule—that 
the state should move to terminate parental rights for a child who has been in 
foster care for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months—applies 
regardless of whether the child is two or twelve.15 
Recognizing that the field of family law needs to engage much more fully 
with remedying this critical gap, I proposed a new subdiscipline of early 
childhood development and the law.  One goal of the subdiscipline is to 
encourage family law scholars to explore numerous legal issues related to 
early childhood development such as: (1) the distinctiveness of the state 
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interest in early childhood; (2) an assessment of the many ways the state fails 
to support families with very young children and the possibilities for a more 
active state role; (3) an intersectional analysis of dangers inherent in this 
more active state role; and (4) the possibilities for doctrinal reform across a 
host of legal fields, including criminal law, employment law, housing law, 
social benefits law, and family law.  A second goal of the subdiscipline is to 
create a bridge to scholars in other disciplines and introduce lawyers and 
legal scholars into the emerging policy debates on fostering early childhood 
development.  This subdiscipline is beginning to take root, with a group of 
legal scholars meeting and exploring the many ways family law can support 
families and foster early childhood development.16 
In all these ways, my work has identified family law’s exclusions.  I have 
been fortunate to be able to shine a light on these exclusions and try to fill 
these holes by offering new theories as well as reforms to the substance, 
process, and practice of family law.  Just as we celebrate one hundred years 
of women at Fordham Law School, I look forward to the time when family 
law is celebrating one hundred years of incorporating a full range of human 
experiences, recognizing a broad range of families, and addressing a wide 
range of issues. 
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